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The California Campaign Spending Limits
Act of 1988: A Constitutional Analysis
Introduction
The role of money in modem electoral politics has substantially in-
creased in the last decade as the cost of campaigning for public office has
escalated.' The increased influence of money on campaigns has gener-
ated concern that the importance of wealth is transforming the public
policymaking process into an exclusive preserve for the affluent, who
now have a greater capacity to win elections and to influence their out-
come.2 In the aftermath of "Watergate", 3 the enormous cost of cam-
paigns has lead to a vigorous movement to reform the campaign finance
process in order to reduce the corrupting influence of money.'
While the power of state and federal legislatures to regulate cam-
paigns is well established,' restrictions on campaign financing are not free
from constitutional controversy.6
Campaign expenditures arguably are a crucial means for communi-
cating political views; therefore, restrictions on the amount of money
1. See A. Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 68-69 & n.253 (1980); 8 F.E.C. REC. 5-8
(Mar. 1982). The total money expenditure for 1986 campaigns in California, including initia-
tives, was close to $150 million. This is a significant increase over earlier campaign years and
represents a steady increase in the cost of politics. Obscene Campaigns, S.F. Chron., Dec. 14,
1986, at F-I, col. 2.
2. See A. Cox, supra note 1, at 69.
3. The term "Watergate" of course refers to the period during the Nixon Administration
when highly placed political figures committed numerous crimes, some involving the illegal
use of campaign money, which cast a cloud of doubt over the role of money in the political
process. See Cox, Forward: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. I,
56 (1980).
Campaign finance measures actually "boast a much longer ... pre-Watergate history."
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ELECTION REFORM, THE AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, CAMPAIGN FI-
NANCING AFTER BUCKLEY V. VALEC vii (1976). For example, by the end of the nineteenth
century, many states required disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures by candi-
dates and their committees. Hart & Shore, Corporate Spending on State and Local Referen-
dums: First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 29 CASE W.L. REV. 808, 816 (1979).
4. In 1974, for example, California voters adopted Proposition 9, which imposed require-
ments for reporting campaign income and expenditures. However, these requirements did
nothing to stop the drastic increase in amounts spent on campaigns. See Obscene Campaigns,
supra note 1. See also infra note 15 and accompanying text.
5. See Smiley v. Valeo, 285 U.S. 355, 359 (1932); Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 661-
62 (1884). The Court has also recognized Congress' right to regulate primary elections in
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941).
6. See infra notes 81-165 and accompanying text.
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that can be spent on a political campaign reduce the ability to express
political ideas as vigorously as possible.7 In general, the First Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution' guarantees citizens the right to
speak freely on political matters without fear of governmental interfer-
ence.9 The United States Supreme Court, however, has upheld limita-
tions on campaign contributions as long as certain constitutional
standards are met. l° Limitations on candidate expenditures, 1 on the
other hand, consistently have been struck down as unconstitutional, un-
less the limitations are voluntary. 12
California, unlike the federal government and thirty-four other
states,13 has not passed legislation that would limit campaign spending
and financing.14 Although California's political campaigns constitute the
7. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
8. The First Amendment provides in part that "Congress shall make no law ... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech. U.S. CONST. amend I.
9. See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516 (1945); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 33 (1925). But see Schenek v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (constitutional right of free speech on political matters is not
absolute).
10. See Citizens Against Rent Control (CARC) v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); Califor-
nia Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981); First Nat'l Bank v. Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Campaign contributions, as defined by the Supreme Court in Bucklei,, consist of: (1)
anything of value, such as gifts, loans, advances, and promises to give; (2) contributions made
directly to the candidate, to an intermediary, or to a committee authorized by the candidate.
424 U.S. at 23.
11. Section 441(b) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 301-406, as
amended by 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1976), broadly defines "expenditure" to include "provisions
of anything of value made for the purpose of influencing any election...."2 U.S.C. § 441(b)
(1985). An expenditure also must constitute "express advocacy" in order to be subject to
§ 316's prohibition. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 107 S. Ct.
616, 618 (1986) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80).
12. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57-58.
13. For a list of the 34 states and their campaign spending limits legislation, see THE
CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, THE NEW GOLD RUSH: FINANCING
CALIFORNIA'S LEGISLATIVE CAMPAIGNS 192-93 (1985) [hereinafter THE NEW GOLD RUSH].
14. Legislative attempts to impose expenditure limitations have been unsuccessful thus
far. Tom Houston, former chairman of the California Political Practices Commission (CPPC),
was an outspoken yet unsuccessful proponent of contribution limitations:
In 1982, under Houston's Chairmanship, the CPPC sponsored three pieces of
legislation: one bill limited campaign contributions in any election to $500 an individ-
ual and $1500 per Public Action Committee ("PAC"), another limited off-year con-
tributions to $100 an individual and $250 a PAC, and a third bill prohibited money
from being solicited or received in any state building including the Capitol. The first
two bills were quickly killed in their first committee hearing. The third bill, after
being amended to prohibit contributions received in any state building, was enacted
by the legislature.
THE NEW GOLD RUSH, supra note 13, at 174, n.29.
California Assembly Speaker Willie Brown recently authored a bill to limit campaign
spending. However, shortly after initiating the bill, Brown withdrew it, having concluded that
contributions have no material effect on the decisions of elected officials. See Willie Brown
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most costly state elections in the nation,"5 there are no significant state
restrictions on the sources or amounts of contributions to candidates for
state offices.16 After extensive study, the California Commission on
Campaign Financing has concluded that comprehensive reforms are nec-
essary to address the full range of legislative campaign financing
problems. 17 A proposed initiative scheduled for the November 1988 bal-
lot, the Proposed Ballot Measure to Adopt The Campaign Spending
Limits Act ("Proposed Ballot Measure"),"8 addresses these problems by
limiting campaign contributions and independent expenditures.' 9 Propo-
nents of the initiative argue that these limitations will decrease campaign
Calls Movement for Campaign Reform a 'Fraud' The S.F. Recorder, July 14, 1987, at 1, col. 2.
Several other California legislators introduced campaign reform measures in 1987. State Sena-
tor Quentin Kopp sponsored two measures which never made it out of the Senate Elections
Committee, according to administrative assistant Barbara Katz. Id. State Senator Bill
Lockyer is the sponsor of a bill which is currently pending before the Assembly Election Com-
mittee. Id.
15. "During the 1982 California election, legislative candidates spent over $43 million,
candidates for Governor and all other statewide ballot measures spent $36 million and con-
gressional candidates spent $31 million." Walters, An Old-Timer vs. New Breed, Sacramento
Bee, Sept. 26, 1984, at A3, col. 1, quoted in THE NEW GOLD RUSH, supra note 13, at 23. In
the 1982 gubernatorial race, Tom Bradley and George Deukmejian spent more than $18 mil-
lion, a 120% jump over the $8.2 million spent by Jerry Brown and Evelle Younger in the 1978
race. THE NEWv GOLD RUSH, supra note 13, at 23.
The California Commission on Campaign Financing compiled these statistics from pub-
lished CPPC reports. For the most part, the CPPC relied on OWENS, TRENDS IN CAMPAIGN
SPENDING IN CALIFORNIA, 1958-1970: TEST OF FACTORS INFLUENCING COSTS (1973). The
data from years before 1974 may be imprecise because of the absence of disclosure require-
ments for candidates.
16. Girard, Campaign Finance Reform in California, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 567, 568
(1983).
17. THE NEW GOLD RUSH, supra note 13, at 1.
18. See Text of Proposed Ballot Measure to Adopt The Campaign Spending Limits Act of
1986 [hereinafter Proposed Ballot Measure] (copy on file with the Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly). The ballot measure comes in the form of an initiative because of the failure to pass
campaign spending limits through the ordinary political process. See supra note 14.
19. The phrase "independent expenditures" refers to spending that is not connected di-
rectly to a candidate or to a candidate's political committee. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
40 (1976); Proposed Ballot Measure, supra note 18, § 85600.
According to the Secretary of State, the Proposed Ballot Measure has qualified for the
June 1988 ballot. Wiegand, Campaign Initiative on June Ballot, S.F. Chron., Oct. 24, 1987, at
A7, col. 1.
Two other initiatives have been registered with the Secretary of State and the State Attor-
ney General but have not yet qualified for the June, 1988 ballot. They are still in the signatory
stage. The first is sponsored by State Assembly Representative Bill Thomas. State senators
Russ Johnson, Joseph Montoya, and Quentin Kopp are supporting the second proposed initia-
tive. In general, these two initiatives limit campaign contributions only, and thus are not as
comprehensive as the Proposed Ballot Measure. Telephone Interview with Marian Markus,
Ass't Executive Director, Common Cause (Nov. 3, 1987). Common Cause is a Los Angeles-
based advocacy group.
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spending and provide easier access to public office for those without great
wealth.
The constitutional validity of the proposed Campaign Spending
Limits Act is in question. Many of the initiative's limitations are similar
to restrictions contained in the Federal Election Campaign Act Amend-
ments of 1974,20 which have been found constitutional.21 Some of the
initiative's provisions, however, impose limitations on which the Court
has not directly ruled.
Part I of this Note discusses California's campaign spending prob-
lem and some of its causes. Part II summarizes the proposed initiative.
Lastly, Part III analyzes the constitutionality of the initiative in light of
recent Supreme Court decisions. This Note contends that if the Court
follows present reasoning, some of the initiative's provisions will not pass
constitutional muster.22 Even if these few provisions were struck down
by the Court, however, the most significant limitations would remain in-
tact, having the likely effect of decreasing the role of wealth in Califor-
nia's political process.
I. The Problem of Rampant California Campaign Spending23
The cost of running a legislative campaign in California is on the
rise.2 4 This section explores the areas of concern over rising campaign
costs and discusses some of the reasons why costs have risen so greatly.
A. Major Areas of Concern Over Rising Campaign Costs
There are four major areas of concern associated with the rising cost
of legislative campaign financing: (1) incumbent advantage; (2) reliance
20. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(b)(1), 88 Stat. 1263, 1272, repealed by Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431-455 (1982)). See also infra notes 54-81 and accompanying text.
21. 'See generally Buckley, 424 U.S. at 1.
22. Indeed, one commentator has speculated that the Court may abandon its present
mode of analysis and hold all limitations on campaign spending unconstitutional. Richards,
The Rise and Fall of Contribution-Expenditure Distinction: Redefining the Acceptable Range of
Campaign Finance Reforms, 18 NEw ENG. L. REV. 367, 394 (1983). If this shift were to
occur, the most significant parts of the referendum would be rendered invalid.
23. The view that rampant campaign spending is a "problem" in California elections is
not universally shared. Some observers argue that more money is needed to inform voters
adequately in California campaigns. See THE NEW GOLD RUSH, supra note 13, at 29. Other
supporters of increased campaign spending argue that legislators in California must spend
more to reach their constituencies, which are the largest in population compared to other
states. Id. Some commentators analogize California campaign spending to the amount of
money some private businesses spend to promote products. California campaigns are
relatively inexpensive by commercial standards. See 100 Leading National Advertisers,
ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 8, 1983.
24. See supra note 15.
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on wealthy contributors; (3) off-year fund raising; and (4) disproportion-
ate contributor influence on legislation.
Incumbents are generally more successful in winning elections for
various reasons including proven performance, name recognition, and ex-
perience in office. To compensate for these advantages, challengers must
spend large sums of money to bring their names and views before the
public eye. Yet, incumbents have superior fundraising ability because
they have made contacts during their tenure in office and have the experi-
ence that successful fundraising requires. Incumbents are widening their
advantage, making campaigns unfair.2 5 This financial advantage alone is
frequently sufficient to defeat challengers at the polls.26 Moreover, the
increased ability of incumbents to outspend challengers deters newcom-
ers from entering politics,27 and thus limits the voters' choice.
A second problem is that rising campaign costs force incumbents to
seek wealthy contributors with large financial stakes in pending legisla-
tion.2" Only these contributors have the ability and willingness to pro-
vide the large sums of money needed to run a successful campaign.29
This financial relationship between candidates and large contributors cre-
ates at least an appearance of impropriety, and fosters corruption of the
political process in the form of quid pro quo arrangements.30  The
Supreme Court has found this a problem which states have a compelling
interest to rectify.
31
25. In 1976, the average Assembly incumbent spent $25,100, while the average challenger
spent $9400, a ratio of almost three to one. By 1984, the incumbent's spending advantage had
increased to fourteen to one. Incumbent outlays increased fourfold during this period while
challengers' expenditures actually decreased from $9400 in 1976 to $8500 in 1984. In the 1984
primary elections, Assembly incumbents outspent challengers by 105 to 1. Senate incumbents
outspent challengers by 229 to 1. THE NEW GOLD RUSH, supra note 13, at 31-32.
The number of truly competitive races, defined by the California Commission on Finance
as races in which each candidate spent $35,000 or more, is decreasing in number. In state
Senate primary elections the percentage of competitive races has dropped by ten to fifteen
percent. Id. at 32-33.
26. "In a district with fairly even Democratic and Republican strength, campaigns can be
highly competitive. Candidates have to spend large amounts to influence the crucial swing
voter and tip the electoral results." THE NEW GOLD RUSH, supra note 13, at 34.
27. "Escalating campaign costs discourage qualified new candidates from running." THE
NEW GOLD RUSH, supra note 13, at 141.
28. Pollard, Campaign Financing: It's Thoroughly Institutionalized Corruption, Stockton
Record, Nov. 19, 1984, at 11, col. 1.
29. Id.
30. Quidpro quo literally means "what for what, something for something, [or] the giving
of one valuable thing for another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1123 (5th ed. 1979). In cam-
paign financing, the quid pro quo for the contributor rests on the assumption that the candi-
date, if elected, will support or oppose legislation to the benefit of the contributor.
31. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976). However, the interest may not be suffi-
ciently compelling to overcome the first amendment interest with which direct campaign limi-
tations interfere. Id. at 27 n.29. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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The third area of concern is off-year fundraising.32 Off-year fund-
raising diverts incumbents' attention from work,3 3 further increases in-
cumbents' fundraising power,34 and decreases real competition in
campaigns.3 Off-year fundraising is particularly susceptible to quid pro
quo abuse.36 Moreover, it fosters the appearance of corruption because
legislators often schedule fundraising events shortly before key legislative
votes to obtain larger contributions, thus making it appear as if contribu-
tors buy votes.3 7
Fourth, large contributions inevitably influence legislation. Rising
campaign costs force candidates to seek new fundraising sources. 38 Find-
ing it less efficient to seek small contributions from individual constitu-
ents inside their own districts, candidates cultivate large, organized
contribution sources from central state locations. Political action com-
mittees ("PAC's"),39 corporations, and labor organizations are the larg-
est sources of campaign money in California.4 Legislators who need the
contributions to succeed are likely to gear their campaigns, and indeed
their actions in office, towards satisfying the goals of these contributors.41
These four factors-incumbents' fundraising advantage, reliance on
wealthy contributors, the practice of off-year fundraising, and the inevi-
table influence of wealthy contributors on legislation-contribute to a se-
32. Off-year fundraising refers to fund-raising activity in any year other than the year the
candidate is listed on the ballot. See Proposed Ballot Measure, supra note 18, § 85309(a).
33. In 1983, incumbent legislators raised a record $14.3 million even though they were
not up for reelection, had no foreseeable opponents, and had no debt. THE NEW GOLD RUSH,
supra note 13, at 7. The time and energy incumbents spend to raise off-year funds obviously
detracts from time which could be focused on legislation. See also id. at 117.
34. In 1983, incumbents raised 99.7% of all off-year campaign contributions. Id. at 8.
35. See id. at 118-20.
36. "In 1983, legislators raised 76 percent of their off-year money by soliciting Sacra-
mento based lobbyists, businesses, and PAC's that had ongoing relations with legislators." Id.
at 8. Lobbyists complain that undue pressure is placed on them to contribute during the off-
year. Id.
37. Id. at 117. The number of fundraisers during the off-year, however, makes it "difficult
to conclude that any one fundraiser was specifically scheduled before a particular vote." Id.
38. Id.
39. A PAC is any committee sponsored by a corporation, labor union, or other group of
persons which receives contributions or makes expenditures over a total of $1,000 during a
calendar year. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(4), 441(b) (1985). The definition of a PAC (or "committee")
under California law is similar. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 82013 (West 1987).
40. During the 1980 through 1984 general election, legislative candidates received an av-
erage of 56 percent of their contributions from PAC's, labor unions, and businesses. THE
NEw GOLD RUSH, supra note 13, at 6.
41. See id. at 5:
In the California Legislature, the voice of the people is being increasingly ig-
nored amid an unprecedented scramble for campaign money. Powerful special inter-
ests bankrolling the election of our representatives have attained such a position of
privilege that even some lawmakers fear that the Legislature is becoming a kept
house.
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rious erosion of public confidence in the democratic system.42 The major
cause underlying these problems is rising campaign costs.
B. Causes of Rising Campaign Costs
Three factors have caused the cost of campaigns to increase: (1) the
candidates' fear that opponents will outspend them; (2) an increased
availability of political money; and (3) the use of more expensive cam-
paign techniques.
Initially, since candidates equate the amount of money spent in a
campaign with the number of votes obtained, they consider it important
to outspend their opponents. As the California Commission on Cam-
paign Financing stated in a 1985 report,
[c]ampaign management is not a scientific process and strategists
cannot predict the precise impact of an additional mailer or an ex-
tra $50,000. Candidates therefore raise and spend as much as they
can, hoping their campaign will not be overwhelmed by large ex-
penditures from the other side. At the very least they try to spend
as much as the other side to prevent defeat or ensure victory. 43
This constant attempt to outspend the opposition creates a never-ending
spiral of increasing costs.
Second, candidates are able to obtain greater amounts of money
from political parties and individual contributors.' Twenty years ago,
candidates knew their opponents could raise only modest amounts .4
Private contributions and partisan political transfers have grown rapidly
in recent years, giving candidates quick access to enormous sums of
money. 6 Knowing that opponents have increased access to money and
that an election can be lost by spending too little, many candidates spend
twice what they need to ensure their success.47 The result is an increase
in the overall cost of campaigns.
An additional reason for rising election costs is the increased use of
42. Opinion polls indicate a low public confidence in government.... In 1984, 74
percent of Californians reported that "state legislators are either very or somewhat
obligated to their campaign contributors"; 46 percent of this group believed the re-
sult is "unfairness" to the average citizen. Massive campaign expenditures, large
private donations and legislative bills linked to sizable donations contribute to the
loss of public confidence in California's governmental institutions.
Id. at 16.
43. Id. at 47.
44. Id. at 49-50. See generally J. HARRIS, CALIFORNIA POLITICS (1967); D. CRESAP,
PARTY POLITICS IN THE GOLDEN STATE (1954); Lowenstein, Forecast from Lowenstein:
Campaign Finance Scandals Ahead, CAL. J., Mar. 1979, at 103.
45. THE NEw GOLD RUSH, supra note 13, at 47.
46. Id. at 95.
47. "Some unopposed legislators spend over $100,000 on campaigns just to deter future
challengers." Id. at 4.
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direct mail.48 Although other forms of spending are still used to win
campaigns," direct mail has become the largest and fastest growing por-
tion of overall spending. Candidates now send a higher volume of
targeted direct mail,5 ° adding enormous costs to campaigns.
5 1
II. The Proposed Initiative
The Proposed Ballot Measure,52 designed to address the problems
arising from increased campaign spending, can be broken down into
three main sections: contribution limitations, expenditure limitations,
which include independent expenditure regulations, and campaign re-
form fund requirements. 3
A. Contribution Limitations
The Proposed Ballot Measure limits contributions by persons, small
contributor PAC's,54 and non-individuals, such as corporations and la-
bor unions. The Proposed Ballot Measure limits contributions from per-
sons to $1,000 per candidate for each election. Organizations are
limited to $2,500 per election. 6 Small contributor PAC's are limited to
$5,000 per candidate for legislative office.5 7 These limitations apply to
money given to controlled committees or to any committee that supports
48. Direct mail techniques, engineered by Michael Berman in 1972, revolutionized the
modem campaign process and drastically increased its cost. Direct mail involves a procedure
by which detailed information taken from voter registration forms is entered into a computer.
Voters are then classified by sex, age, place of birth, occupation, and other characteristics. The
computer divides the voters into smaller and more specialized campaign groups, making it
possible for candidates writing general campaign messages to bypass unfriendly and friendly
voters and to focus on the undecided. See Tobe, New Techniques in Computerized Voter Con-
tact, Campaigns & Elections, Summer, 1984; THE NEW GOLD RUSH, supra note 13, at 35.
49. THE NEw GOLD RUSH, supra note 13, at 38-40.
50. Id. at 36.
51. Id. at 37.
52. See supra note 18.
53. The campaign fund is the fund out of which limited matching funds will be given to
candidates who voluntarily accept the expenditure limitations.
54. A "small contributor political action committee" is a committee which meets the fol-
lowing criteria: (a) All contributions to the committee from any single person in a twelve-
month period total $50 or less; (b) The committe has existed for at least six months; (c) The
committee contributes to at least five candidates; (d) The committee is not controlled by a
candidate. Proposed Ballot Measure, supra note 18, § 85202.
55. Proposed Ballot Measure, supra note 18, §§ 85300(a), 85300(c). Primary and general
elections are treated as separate elections. Id. § 85300(a). Contributions made before July I of
the election year are primary contributions; those made from July 1 through December 31 of
the election year are general election contributions. Id. § 85317.
56. Id. §§ 85300(b), 85300(d). "Organization" refers to "a proprietorship, labor union,
firm, partnership, joint venture, syndicate, business trust, company, corporation, association or
committee which has 25 or more employees, shareholders, contributors or members." Id.
§ 85206.
57. Id. § 85300.
the candidate. 8 The limits apply to contributions to political parties and
legislative caucus committees as well.59
The Proposed Ballot Measure also limits the aggregate contributions
candidates or candidate-supporting committees may receive. For contri-
butions by non-individuals, Assembly candidates are limited to an aggre-
gate of $50,000 and Senate candidates to an aggregate of $75,000. The
provision applies to both general and primary elections; however, it ex-
empts contributions from political parties and legislative caucuses. ° The
Proposed Ballot Measure limits the aggregate contributions by persons to
$25,000 over a two-year period.61 Organizations and small contributor
PAC's are limited to aggregate contributions of $200,000 over a two-year
period.62
The Proposed Ballot Measure prevents large contributors from
evading the contribution limits by prohibiting candidates or their con-
trolled committees from accepting any form of honorarium or gift valued
at more than $2,000.63 Thus, contributions exceeding the $2,000 limit
cannot be disguised as gifts. Furthermore, transfers between candidates,
candidate-controlled committees, and other candidates and their com-
mittees are prohibited.'
The Proposed Ballot Measure prohibits off-year contributions. Leg-
islative candidates may not accept contributions in "any year other than
the year in which the legislative candidate or legislator is listed on the
ballot as a candidate for legislative office.",6 ' Legislative caucus commit-
tees and political party committees that support or oppose legislative
candidates are prohibited from making contributions in odd-numbered
years.66
Finally, the Proposed Ballot Measure contains a loan limitation
which provides that "a loan shall be considered a contribution from the
maker and the guarantor of the loan and shall be subject to the contribu-
tion limitations" of the Measure.6 However, a loan made to a candidate
by a commercial lending institution in the regular course of business, on
the same terms as those available to the public, and which is secured or
guaranteed is not subject to the contribution limit.68
58. Id. §§ 85300, 85301.
59. Id. § 85302.
60. Id. § 85305.
61. Id. § 85306. The two-year period commences on January I of an odd-numbered year.
Id. § 85204.
62. Id. § 85307.
63. Id. § 85310.
64. Id. § 85308.
65. Id. § 85309(a).
66. Id. § 85309(b).
67. Id. § 85313(a).
68. Id. § 85313(c).
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B. Expenditure Limitations
The Proposed Ballot Measure caps all expenditures in California
legislative races if candidates accept limited matching funds.69 The Pro-
posed Ballot Measure provides that "[n]o candidate for State Assembly
who files a statement of acceptance of financing from the Campaign Re-
form Fund [nor] any controlled committee of such a candidate shall
make qualified expenditures above" $150,000 in a primary election or
$225,000 in a general election.70 State Senate candidates who accept
matching funds can accept no more than $250,000 in a primary election
and $350,000 in a general election.71 In both general and primary elec-
tions, if an opposing candidate runs for the same seat and declines
matching funds, exceeding the expenditure limits, the expenditure ceiling
will no longer apply and the complying candidate may receive an addi-
tional $35,000 from the matching fund.72
C. Independent Expenditures
Persons who make independent expenditures for a mass mailing
supporting or opposing candidates for legislative office must put a state-
ment on the mailing, giving their name and disavowing any financial con-
nection to any candidate.73 The Proposed Ballot Measure also imposes a
$1000 ceiling per person and a $75,000 ceiling per organization on con-
tributions to any person or group who makes independent expenditures
supporting or opposing a legislative candidate.74 This provision discour-
69. A "limited matching fund", also known as a "Campaign Reform Fund", is a fund
created by proposed § 18775 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code which is part of the
Proposed Ballot Measure.
The Proposed Ballot Measure provides that candidates must meet certain requirements to
qualify for limited matching funds:
(a) The candidate [must have] received contributions (other than contributions
from the candidate or his or her immediate family) of at least twenty thousand dol-
lars ... in contributions of one thousand dollars ... or less if running for the Assem-
bly, or at least thirty thousand dollars ... in contributions of one thousand dollars
... or less if running for the Senate ....
(b) In the primary election, the candidate [must be] opposed by a candidate
running for the same nomination who has qualified for payments from the Campaign
Reform Fund or has raised, spent or has cash on hand of at least thirty-thousand
dollars ....
(c) In the general election, the candidate [must be] opposed by a candidate who
has qualified for payments from the Campaign Reform Fund or has raised, spent or
has cash on hand of at least thirty-five thousand dollars ....
(d) The candidate [must contribute] no more than fifty thousand dollars... per
election from his or her personal funds to the legislative campaign.
Proposed Ballot Measure, supra note 18, § 85501.
70. Proposed Ballot Measure, supra note 18, § 85400.
71. Id. § 85401.
72. Id. §§ 85402, 85403.
73. Id. § 85600.
74. Id. § 85601.
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ages the giving of large sums of money to independent committees in
order to circumvent the proposed contribution limitations. A person
who contributes more than $100 to a legislative candidate will be consid-
ered part of that candidate's controlled committee.75
D. The Campaign Reform Fund
Each candidate may either accept or reject assistance from the
matching fund. To accept fund money, the candidate must comply with
the expenditure limitations defined in the Proposed Ballot Measure.76 A
statement of rejection or acceptance must be made before the candidate
spends or accumulates more than $35,000.7 7 To qualify for assistance
from the fund, the candidate must have received a minimum amount of
contributions to insure the legitimacy of his or her participation in the
race. 78 The maximum amount available to an Assembly candidate is
$75,000 in a primary and $112,500 in a general election. 79 A Senate can-
didate has $125,000 in matching funds available in the primary election
and $175,000 in the general election.80
III. Constitutional Analysis of the Initiative
Although carefully drafted to avoid constitutional entanglements,
the Proposed Ballot Measure contains provisions which violate first
amendment rights of political expression." The Supreme Court has ruled
that "contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the
most fundamental First Amendment activities ... [and that] the First
Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression
in order 'to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people.' "82
In Buckley v. Valeo,83 the plaintiffs challenged many of the 1974
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act ("Federal Act").84
The United States Supreme Court struck down the Federal Act's cam-
75. Id. § 85602.
76. See supra note 69.
77. Proposed Ballot Measure, supra note 18, § 85500.
78. Id. § 85501(a).
79. Id. § 85504(a).
80. Id. § 85504(b).
81. See infra notes 100-107 and accompanying text. Since 1925 the Supreme Court has
held that first amendment freedoms apply through the Fourteenth Amendment to restrict state
conduct. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Some would say the first case so holding
is Fisk v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (no evidence to support criminal syndicalism convic-
tion), even though no reference to the First Amendment appears in the opinion.
82. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957)).
83. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
84. 2 U.S.C. §§ 301-406 (1971), as amended by 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1976).
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paign expenditure limits"5 as violative of the First Amendment, but up-
held contribution limits. 6 The Court held, per curiam, that campaign
contributions and expenditures constituted political expression because
of the importance of money in furthering the discussion of public issues
and debate on the qualifications of candidates.8 7
Because it viewed contribution and expenditure limits as restrictions
on political expression, the Court reviewed the Federal Act with "exact-
ing scrutiny.' ' 8' Regulations must satisfy two requirements to withstand
strict scrutiny: (1) they must serve a "compelling interest" of the govern-
85. The amendments limited any person to $1,000 in independent expenditures on behalf
of any clearly identified federal candidate. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101(b)(1), 88 Stat. 1263, 1272, repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90
Stat. 475 (1976). As defined by the Federal Election Campaign Act, the term "persons" in-
cludes "an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, labor organization or
any other organization or group of persons." 2 U.S.C. § 431(11) (1983).
86. The amendments imposed a $1,000 limit per election on individual contributions by
persons to a single candidate and a $25,000 ceiling on total contributions by an individual to
all candidates in any year. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (1976). Buckley also upheld the provisions
requiring disclosure and recordkeeping, 424 U.S. at 66-68, and the scheme for public funding
of presidential campaigns. Id. at 107-09.
87. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
Justice White disagreed with the plurality's equation of money with speech, and would
have upheld both the federal contribution and expenditure limitations. 424 U.S. at 259 (J.
White, concurring and dissenting). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
803-05 (1978). Indeed, Congress could justifiably have believed that large-scale campaign ad-
vertising, funded by large contributions, actually drowns out certain viewpoints, and that the
limits may help to remedy this problem of stifled speech and therefore increase political debate.
88. In determining the proper standard of analysis, the Court distinguished the Federal
Act from the prohibition against draft card burning upheld in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Brien, the defendant had burned his draft card in public to protest the
Vietnam war, violating a statute that prohibited the knowing destruction or mutilation of a
draft card. The Court upheld the convictions. Id. at 380. The O'Brien Court noted a differ-
ence between regulation of speech-related conduct to prevent harm unrelated to the message
(the O'Brien situation) and regulation that suppresses speech when a particular form of expres-
sion is perceived as harmful (such as campaign spending limitations). Id. at 376-77. In
O'Brien situations, speech can be regulated if four elements are met: (1) the regulation is
within the constitutional power of the government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; (3) the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4)
the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of the governmental interest. Id. at 368.
In Buckley, the Court distinguished O'Brien and concluded that the federal government's
interest in regulating contribution and expenditure limitations "arises in some measure because
the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful." 424 U.S.
at 17 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382). For a contrary view, see Wright, Politics and the Consti-
tution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1007-08 (1976); L. TRIBE, supra note 87, at 803-
05.
Professor Laurence Tribe has argued that the Federal Act's provisions were content-neu-
tral since they did not represent an attempt to favor a particular message or class of messages.
Thus, he feels the Court's decision to apply the strict scrutiny test reserved for non-content-
neutral regulations is questionable. L. TRIBE, supra note 87, at 800-01. However, despite the
scarcity of evidence before the Court that the limitations favored messages by incumbents, the
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ment; and (2) they must be narrowly drawn to achieve that objective
without unnecessary interference with first amendment rights. 89
A. Contribution Limitations
Contributions to candidates or political committees involve two first
amendment rights. Freedom of speech is involved because a contribu-
tor's donation of money represents a symbolic expression as well as ac-
tual support for a particular view, candidate, or organization.
Contributions also involve the freedom of association 90 because contribu-
tions affiliate donors with candidates and enable "like-minded persons to
pool their resources in furtherance of common political goals." 91
Buckley held that the Federal Act's contribution limits do not vio-
late the First Amendment.92 The Court found that contribution limits
do not improperly abridge associational freedoms, since the contributor
is still free under the Federal Act to join any political association and to
assist personally in an association's efforts on behalf of candidates. 93 Ad-
possibility that the limitations would have this effect could support the Court's decision to
apply strict scrutiny. Id. at 802 nn.8 & 10.
The Court carefully noted a distinction between the speech interests involved in direct
expenditures by a candidate or independent entity and those involved in contributions. De-
spite this distinction, the Court applied the same strict scrutiny standard to both types of
speech. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
89. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.
90. Although not expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, the right to free associa-
tion has been considered a major first amendment guarantee since NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958). There, the Court held that the First Amendment barred Alabama from com-
pelling production of NAACP membership lists. The opinion used the phrase "freedom of
association" repeatedly, and elevated freedom of association to "an independent right, possess-
ing an equal status with the other rights specifically enumerated in the First Amendment."
Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1964). See
Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 22
(1976); cf. Note, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 178-79 (1976).
91. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22.
92. Id. at 38. Deferring to legislative intent, the Court found it within Congress' province
to conclude that contribution ceilings were necessary and proper. Id. at 28.
93. Id. at 22. The Court stated that limitations on the size of contributions
[entail] only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free
communication. A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the
candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying bases for the sup-
port. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase percepti-
bly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing.... A limitation on the amount of
money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little
direct restraint on his political communication ....
1d. at 20-21.
Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing that contributions are simply a way of "pooling"
money, and are thus associational activities comparable, for example, to volunteer work. Free-
dom of association, as well as freedom of speech, in Burger's view, requires that campaign
contributions be free from restrictions if there is a satisfactory, less-restrictive alternative. An-
tibribery laws and disclosure requirements would be sufficient, according to Burger, to address
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ditionally, the Court ruled that contribution limits do not unconstitution-
ally interfere with freedom of speech. The Court found that
contributions to candidates are an "attenuated form of speech" or
"speech by proxy" because "the transformation of contributions into
political debate involves speech by someone other than the contribu-
tor."94 The Court reasoned that speech interests embodied in monetary
contributions are relatively weak compared to the direct speech interests
furthered by candidate or independent expenditures.95
The Court also found that the state has a strong governmental inter-
est in regulating campaign contributions, thereby decreasing corruption
and the appearance of corruption in actual or apparent quid pro quo ar-
rangements.96 The Court identified public confidence in representational
government as a crucial element at the heart of America's political sys-
tem, and ruled that protecting this interest was sufficiently compelling to
warrant limiting the speech interest inherent in campaign contribu-
tions.97 Furthermore, less restrictive alternatives, including anti-bribery
and disclosure laws, would not be sufficient to root out the appearance of
corruption and actual opportunities for corruption.98 Therefore, the
the corruption problems inherent in large contributions. Id. at 246 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(disclosure requirements are "the simple and wholly efficacious answer" to flushing out cor-
rupt contribution practices).
94. Id. at 21.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 29. The Court treated the appearance of corruption as an evil as great as actual
corruption. Id. at 27. See also United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973).
97. 424 U.S. at 26-27. Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Buckley rejected the Court's view
that there was a compelling interest. Id. at 241-46 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 27-28. The Court's more recent ruling in Citizens Against Rent Control
(CARC) v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981), suggests the Court's reasoning on this point may
have shifted since Buckley. Chief Justice Burger authored the majority opinion in CARC,
expressing many of the views promoted in his Buckley dissent. In Buckley, he argued that
limitations on political speech were unconstitutional even if justified by concern with the ap-
pearance of corruption. In CARC, the Supreme Court struck down a municipal ordinance
which placed a $250 limit on contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot
measures. Id. at 292. Thus, there was no state interest to outweigh the interference with
protected first amendment rights.
CARC suggests that a majority of the Court may have shifted away from the Buckley per
curiam view that contribution limits are constitutionally distinguishable from expenditure lim-
its. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REv. 165 (1982). In CARC, Chief
Justice Burger emphasized that "placing limits on contributions which in turn limit expendi-
tures plainly impairs freedom of expression." 454 U.S. at 297. Furthermore, in omitting men-
tion of the contribution-expenditure distinction, the Court called into question the validity of
all campaign finance limitations, including contribution limitations.
Speculation concerning the significance of CARC should be qualified, however, in two
ways. First, Chief Justice Burger, who authored CARC and strongly argued that first amend-
ment rights override any rationale for restricting political speech, no longer sits on the court.
Second, CARC involved ballot measure campaigns, which do not have the same possibility of
quid pro quo arrangements as candidate campaigns. Thus, the governmental interest found
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Federal Act's contribution limits withstood the Court's strict scrutiny.
The California Proposed Ballot Measure's contribution limits are
similar to those of the Federal Act in that they limit campaign contribu-
tions of individuals, organizations, and PAC's to $1000, $2500, and
$5000, respectively, for primary and general elections.99 Since the
Supreme Court upheld similar Federal Act contribution limits in Buck-
ley, many of the Proposed Ballot Measure limitations appear to be consti-
tutionally sound.
The Proposed Ballot Measure goes further than the Federal Act,
however, and would impose an aggregate cap on the contributions a can-
didate may receive from non-individuals in all elections.'00 No court has
yet reviewed aggregate contribution limits. The constitutionality of this
type of limit is suspect on two grounds.
First, an aggregate contribution limit is tantamount to a flat ban on
contributions from late-paying organizations. Once a candidate has re-
ceived the maximum in contributions from non-individuals, other organi-
zations would be barred from contributing at all. In effect, late-paying
organizations would be completely prohibited from what the Supreme
Court has labeled "speech by proxy,"10' and thus would be deprived of
their first amendment right to make contributions. In addition, the ag-
gregate limits would interfere with the political process by pressuring or-
ganizations to contribute early in the campaign. Contributors might
prefer to wait until late in the campaign, timing their contributions in
accord with their own strategic goals. If these contributors were pre-
cluded from donating because of the aggregate contribution limits, their
free speech rights would be completely abridged under the Proposed Bal-
lot Measure. 102 The Supreme Court has determined that the interest in
protecting speech by proxy is less strong than the interest in protecting
more direct forms of speech.103 The Court also has upheld flat prohibi-
tions on contributions by corporations and labor unions. 0 4 The Court
inapplicable in CARC-the concern to prevent impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in political campaigns-may still be compelling in the context of candidate campaigns.
99. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(3) (1985); see also supra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
101. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. See supra text accompanying note 94.
102. Aggregate contribution limits might be treated as a time restriction which would be
valid if the state could meet the lower standard applicable to content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions. For a discussion of this lower standard, see infra note 116.
103. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
104. In California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981), the
court stated:
The differing restrictions placed on individuals and unincorporated associations,
on the one hand, and on unions and corporations, on the other, reflect a judgment by
Congress that these entities have differing structures and purposes, and that they
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has not yet decided, however, whether speech by proxy could be prohib-
ited completely for all other types of organizations.
Second, if contributions are characterized as speech by proxy, aggre-
gate limits on contributions must serve a compelling state interest to
withstand the strict scrutiny test. 10 5 The Court has refused to find inter-
ests such as equalizing candidates' ability to spend and decreasing overall
spending sufficiently compelling to justify contribution regulations. 0 6
Furthermore, the interest in preventing corruption arguably is not appli-
cable to aggregate limitations. Non-individuals already would be limited
to contributions of $2500 under the proposed initiative using the same
rationale of preventing corruption or the appearance of impropriety.
Logically, if corruption would not result from seventy organizations each
contributing $1000 to a candidate, the seventy-first $1000 contribution
should not trigger a presumption of corruption. Hence, the interest in
suppressing corruption and the appearance of corruption would not ap-
ply to this type of contribution limitation. Without other compelling in-
terests, this limit would not meet the strict scrutiny test.
10 7
The California Proposed Ballot Measure also limits the total aggre-
gate amount a person, organization, or PAC may contribute per elec-
tion. 08 This limit resembles the ceiling on individual contributions
contained in the Federal Act0 9 and probably would be upheld as consti-
tutional. In Buckley, the Court approved the federal total contribution
limit, concluding it was necessary to prevent individuals from evading
the basic contribution limit."0 The Federal Act limits contributions to
$25,000 a year; the, Proposed Ballot Measure limits persons to $25,000
over a two-year period because of the ban on off-year fundraising. This
timing distinction, however, would not be important to the Supreme
Court, which focused on the type of limitation, rather than the amount.
The same reasoning would apply to organizations and PAC's and thus
total aggregate contribution limits would be upheld for them as well.
The California Proposed Ballot Measure treats gifts and honoraria
as contributions."' Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the
constitutionality of this type of provision, a limitation on gifts would not
be held unconstitutional under the majority's reasoning in Buckley. Gifts
are things of value and therefore would fall under the definition of contri-
butions. Gifts can be used improperly or can create the appearance of
105. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
109. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(3) (1985).
110. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976). Without the total limit, persons could make
many contributions to political committees which could then rechannel those contributions
back to the candidate.
111. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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impropriety. Gift contributions, moreover, may be accorded a lower level
of protection than monetary contributions, since gifts are less likely to
buy speech than is money. Finally, the ability to give gifts is arguably
less like speech than is the ability to contribute money. For example, a
candidate receiving a gift horse is unable to buy a telivision advertise-
ment until the horse is sold. Gifts are one step removed from the speech
process. Thus, allowing a limit on gifts may be justified by the relatively
strong governmental interest in combatting corruption.
Another provision of the Proposed Ballot Measure would ban trans-
fers between candidates by completely eliminating contributions from
one candidate to another. 112 No court has addressed this specific type of
limitation. The speech interests associated with transfers are minimal.
Transfers do not affect the transferor's own speech rights, since the trans-
fer only involves a relay of another contributor's money. Nor does the
ban affect the original contributor's speech rights since that contributor
is still able to give to any candidate. In addition, transfers have a great
potential for corrupt quid pro quo arrangements. In transfer situations,
political favors are likely to be expected in return for brokering contribu-
tions by incumbents to candidates. Given the minimal speech interests
involved in transfers and their potential corrupting influence, the Court
would uphold this limitation.
The Proposed Ballot Measure also prevents candidates or incum-
bents from receiving contributions during non-election years.' 13 This
provision is constitutional for two reasons: (1) even if considered a re-
straint on the content of speech, the provision is justified by a compelling
state interest; and (2) the provision is only a time, place, and manner
restriction and hence does not require a compelling state interest to be
constitutional.
First, off-year contributions are likely to be significantly more cor-
rupting of the legislative process than contributions made at any other
time." '4 A prohibition on off-year contributions, therefore, would de-
crease both the opportunity for improper conduct and the appearance of
impropriety. These state interests have proved sufficiently compelling to
outweigh the burden on free speech accompanying a complete ban on
contributions in non-election years." 5 Moreover, a prohibition on off-
year fundraising would not deprive contributors of the opportunity to
make contributions, nor would it necessarily deprive candidates of con-
tributions. California would be limiting only the time when contributions
or speech by proxy could be made. Similar time, place, and manner re-
strictions on speech which preserve some opportunities for expression
112. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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have consistently been upheld by the Court." 6
Finally, the Proposed Ballot Measure places a limit on loans, treat-
ing loans as contributions when made by an entity other than a commer-
cial lending institution.117 This regulation would be upheld for several of
the reasons stated above. The loan would not be considered direct
speech and thus the speech interests involved would be no greater than
for contributions. Further, loans could elicit a quid pro quo arrangement
just as do contributions. Thus, there would be a compelling state interest
to decrease actual corruption and the appearance of corruption.
The Proposed Ballot Measure's contribution limitations should eas-
ily meet the second prong of the strict scrutiny test. In Buckley, the
Court found that since antibribery and disclosure laws could not root out
corruption or the appearance of corruption, contribution limitations con-
stitute the government's least restrictive alternative for furthering its
compelling interest.118 The Supreme Court, therefore, likely would find
that the Proposed Ballot Measure's contribution limitations are the




In Buckley, the Court perceived expenditure limitations as a more
direct and substantial restraint on free speech than contribution limita-
tions.1 19 The Court found expenditure limitations constitutionally inva-
lid, 2' after determining that there was no sufficiently compelling
governmental interest to justify this burden on speech.
The strongest state interest proposed to support expenditure limits
was the same interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of
impropriety. 12' However, the Court decided that expenditures do not
involve the same corrupting tendencies as contributions' 22 because the
116. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (zoning of protected speech into
late evening broadcast hours is permissible); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50
(1976) (zoning of adult movie theatres is permissible). Generally, the Court will apply a three-
part test to determine whether time, place, and manner restriction are valid: (1) the restric-
tion must be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech; (2) the restric-
tion must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; (3) the restriction
must leave open alternative channels for communication of information. Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
117. Proposed Ballot Measure, supra note 18, § 85313(c). See supra notes 67-68 and accom-
panying text.
118. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
119. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52 (1976).
120. Id. at 57-58.




threat of political quid pro quo arrangements does not exist with candi-
date expenditures. Indeed, the Court stated that "the use of personal
funds reduces the candidate's dependence on outside contributions and
thereby counteracts the [coercion]... [to which] the [Federal] Act's con-
tribution limitations are directed."'1
23
The strongest justification for candidate expenditure limits centered
on the argument that such limits are necessary to equalize candidates'
relative financial resources. 124  The Court considered this interest
"clearly not sufficient to justify the provision's infringement on funda-
mental First Amendment rights."' 25 Expenditure limitations failed to
promote financial equality for two reasons. First, a wealthy candidate
who is forced to spend less of her personal resources may still outspend
her rival as a result of superior fundraising efforts. Second, an un-
restricted wealthy candidate's fundraising persuasion may be impeded,
because his need for contributions is less. 126 More fundamentally, the
First Amendment could not tolerate a restriction upon the candidate's
right to speak on behalf of his own candidacy.' 27
Accordingly, the Court ruled that spending limits placed a substan-
tial burden on political expression while failing to advance any compel-
ling governmental interest.'28 The Court, however, would allow
Congress to create a scheme for publicly funding elections. Such a
scheme could require a candidate to choose between respecting an aggre-
gate spending limit or losing the public subsidy.'29 Simply placing limits
on candidate expenditures, however, would violate the First
Amendment.
The Proposed Ballot Measure includes a spending ceiling on cam-
paigns in all races where candidates accept public matching funds.' 3 '
Buckley indicates that candidate expenditures are entitled to greater pro-
tection under the First Amendment than contribution limitations.1
3
1
Moreover, the legitimate governmental interest in reducing corruption or
the appearance of corruption is not served by expenditure limitations.1
3 2
The Court ruled in Buckley, however, that the Federal Act's provision
allowing candidates to agree to comply with expenditure ceilings in ex-
change for matching funds did not violate the Constitution. 3 3 The Pro-
123. Id.





129. Id. at 107-08.
130. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
131. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 52, 53.
132. Id. at 53.
133. Id. at 107-08.
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posed Ballot Measure's expenditure limits are similarly structured,
requiring that candidates adhere to a spending ceiling as a condition for
receiving limited public matching funds."13 These limits, therefore, would
be constitutional under Buckley.
2. Independent Expenditures
In Buckley, the Court treated independent expenditure limitations
differently from candidates' expenditure limitations but also struck down
independent expenditure limits as unconstitutional. The Court's reason-
ing may condemn even expenditure limitations that have been proven to
stem corruption and the appearance of corruption. The Court viewed
political expenditures as direct speech entitled to higher protection than
contributor speech by proxy. 35 In addition, the Court reasoned that
"independent advocacy ... does not presently appear to pose dangers of
real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large
campaign contributions." '136 The candidate's inability to prearrange and
coordinate use of independent contributions reduces the value of these
expenditures and alleviates the danger of quid pro quo arrangements.
1 37
Relying on this reasoning, the Court rejected the argument that statutory
limits on independent expenditures prevent would-be contributors from
circumventing contribution limitations. These expenditures, the Court
concluded, are not susceptible to abuse to the same degree as contribu-
tions controlled by the candidate. 38 The independent expenditure ceil-
ings thus failed to further an interest that would overcome the heavy
burden the limitation put on protected expression.
1 39
The Court rejected as insufficiently compelling two additional gov-
ernmental interests advanced in support of independent expenditure lim-
its. First, the Court held invalid any governmental interest in equalizing
the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of
elections. 140 The Court emphasized that restricting the voice of some ele-
134. Proposed Ballot Measure, supra note 18, § 85500.
135. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-20.
136. Id. at 46. Quid pro quo arrangements could arise in independent expenditure situa-
tions. A candidate would be more likely to cultivate the favor of those who organize and
control helpful independent expenditures. See L. TRIBE, supra note 87, at 805.
137. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
138. Id. at 47-48.
139. Professor Ray Forrester argues that contribution limitations may be circumvented by
making independent expenditures. Candidates will feel the same gratitude towards entities who
spend large amounts of money independently as they would feel toward those who donate
money directly. Class Notes, Hastings College of the Law, Mar. 4, 1987 (lecture on Constitu-
tional Law).
140. 424 U.S. at 48. Some commentators argue that it is not inconsistent with first amend-
ment values to curb spending by the wealthy to preserve the integrity of the system. See, e.g.,
L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 193-94 (1985); Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Con-
stitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. REV.
ments of society in order to enhance the voices of others is a practice
repugnant to the First Amendment.14 1 Second, the Court considered the
governmental interest in curbing the skyrocketing costs of political cam-
paigns insufficient to outweigh the first amendment right to spend as
much as one wished to express a viewpoint. 142 The First Amendment,
the Court stated, "denies government the power to determine that spend-
ing to promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise."
' 143
More recent cases have upheld independent expenditure limits. For
example, in California Medical Association (CMA) v. Federal Election
Commission,'" the Court upheld a federal regulation barring individuals
and associations from contributing more than $5,000 per year to any
"multi-candidate political committee." Such contributions were viewed
by the Court as speech by someone other than the candidate; limitations
on this type of independent contribution were thus valid as long as the
government showed a compelling interest. 145 Furthermore, the Court
reasoned that without limits on contributions to independent commit-
tees, limits on contributions to candidates could be easily circumvented,
thus fostering actual or apparent corruption.' 46 In rejecting the argu-
ment that antibribery and disclosure statutes eliminated the need for this-
type of contribution limitation, the Court stated:
Because we conclude that the challenged limitation does not re-
strict the ability of individuals to engage in protected political ad-
vocacy, Congress was not required to select the least restrictive
means of protecting the integrity of its legislative scheme. Instead,
Congress could reasonably have concluded [that the limit on con-
tributions to multi-candidate committees] was a useful supplement
to the other antifraud provisions of the Act. 1
47
Although this language indicates that the Court views these contribu-
tions as entitled to less first amendment protection, the Court explicitly
found that the state has a compelling interest supporting limits on contri-
butions to independent committees. Because contributions to multicandi-
date committees constitute only indirect speech for the Court, however,
323, 336; Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to
Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982).
141. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
142. Id. at 48-49. Professor Tribe maintains that democratic ideals would not be ill served
by a system which rewards candidates who can raise vast amounts of money through large
numbers of "grass roots" contributors, while prohibiting millionaires from buying elections.
L. TRIBE, supra note 87, at 807. Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Buckley, observed that "in
the Nation's seven largest States in 1970, 11 of 15 major senatorial candidates were million-
aires. The four who were not millionaires lost their bid for election." 424 U.S. at 288 n.1
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Wright, supra note 140, at 625-31.
143. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57.
144. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
145. Id. at 198.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 199 n.20.
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the limitations need not be shown to be the least restrictive burden on
first amendment rights.148
The Supreme Court recently added a twist to campaign finance law.
In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life
(MCFL),149 the Court held that the sections of the Federal Act prohibit-
ing direct independent expenditure of corporate funds in connection with
election to public office1 50 were constitutional on their face, but violated
the First Amendment as applied to the appellee corporation.1 5' This rul-
ing suggests that when dealing with independent expenditure regulations,
the Court may be willing to apply a case-by-case analysis. A restrictive
provision would be analyzed on its face under the strict scrutiny test,
while an application of the provision would be analyzed on the facts of
the case. A compelling governmental interest must be demonstrated on
the facts of each case to overcome the first amendment burden placed on
the individual involved. MCFL also reaffirms that corporations may be
more restricted constitutionally than individuals or PAC's in the area of
campaign financing.
152
The independent expenditure limitations of the California Proposed
Ballot Measure provide for disclosure by those making independent ex-
penditures. 153 Moreover, the Proposed Ballot Measure imposes the pre-
viously discussed contribution limitations on supporters of those making
independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate or in opposition to a
candidate. 1
5 4
Although stricter and more sweeping than the provisions of the Fed-
eral Act, the independent expenditure limitations in the California Pro-
posed Ballot Measure would be constitutional under the reasoning in
CMA. There is no limit on the amount which can be spent individually
in the Measure; it contains only a restriction on the amount which can be
contributed to a political committee. This speech by proxy is not the sort
of political advocacy that the Court in Buckley found entitled to the
148. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27-28 (requiring a showing that effective bribery and disclo-
sure statutes eliminated need for contribution limitations).
149. 107 S. Ct. 616 (1986).
150. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1971).
151. 107 S. Ct. at 630-31.
152. Id. at 628. See supra notes 104 & 118 and accompanying text. Butsee Federal Elec-
tion Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm'n (NCPAC), 470 U.S. 480
(1985). In NCPAC, the Court struck down a federal provision prohibiting a PAC from spend-
ing more than $1,000 on behalf of a presidential candidate who has chosen to receive federal
campaign financing. Relying heavily on the reasoning in Buckley, the Court invalidated ex-
penditure limitations on individuals who act independently of candidates. The interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of impropriety was too attenuated for the Court to
find the interest compelling. Id. at 501.
153. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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highest first amendment protection. 1 55 Furthermore, the same compel-
ling interest that the Court pointed to in CMA supports the Proposed
Ballot Measure provision: without this provision, contribution limita-
tions could be easily avoided, leading to possible quid pro quo arrange-
ments and corruption or the appearance of corruption."5 6 Since this
limitation does not affect one's ability to engage in protected speech,-it
would not have to meet the second prong of the test. 157 CMA suggests
that the Court would defer to the decision of the California voters if they
conclude that the provision is a useful supplement to antifraud and an-
tibribery statutes in California.
The greater breadth of the independent expenditure limitation in the
proposed initiative arguably might lead to an overbroad 5 8 prohibition on
speech. The Federal Act limits only individual contributions toward in-
dependent expenditures to $5,000; the California Proposed Ballot Mea-
sure, on the other hand, limits individual independant expenditures to
$1000, organizations to $2500, and PAC's to $5000. The Supreme
Court, however, has never viewed as determinative either the dollar
amount of the limitation or the person or group on whom the limitation
is placed. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the Court again
would defer to the California voters, concluding that these limits are nec-
essary to further their interests.
C. Campaign Reform Fund
The California initiative proposes that matching funds be made
available to candidates on a limited basis.159 In Buckley, the Supreme
Court upheld a comparable system for presidential elections. The Court
identified several advantages to a limited public financing plan that
would match candidates' funds. First, it viewed limited public financing
as a means of eliminating the improper influence of large private contri-
butions.' 60 Second, such funding "implicates the policies against foster-
ing frivolous candidates, creating a system of splintered parties, and
encouraging unrestrained factionalism."' 61 Finally, the Court concluded
that public financing did not infringe on candidates' first amendment
155. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
157. California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 199 n.20 (1981).
158. "An overbroad statute is one that is designed to burden or punish activities which are
not constitutionally protected, but the statute includes within its scope activities which are
protected by the First Amendment." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 722 (1978). For examples of how the doctrine is applied, see Lewis v. City of
New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
159. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
160. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 107-08 (1976).
161. Id. at 106.
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rights since the candidate voluntarily could choose not to be limited.162
The federal court for the Southern District of New York elaborated
on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Republican National Committee v.
Federal Election Commission. 63 In that case, the court explained that
limited public financing furthered two important government concerns:
(1) it enabled candidates to lessen the drain on their time and energies
due to fundraising and provided more time for competitive debate on the
issues for the electorate;' and (2) it eliminated reliance on large private
contributions without decreasing the candidates' ability to get their
message to the people.16
Offering a candidate matching funds does not require the candidate
to sacrifice constitutional rights, even when expenditure ceilings are a
condition for receipt of public funds. Instead, matching funds offer the
candidate a choice between two methods of exercising the same constitu-
tional right. The Proposed Ballot Measure's matching fund provision
thus would be constitutional.
Conclusion
Campaign finance regulations often pose first amendment considera-
tions. The Supreme Court has held that restrictions on the flow of
money into and out of political campaigns can affect the discussion of
public issues and the debate on candidates' qualifications. These func-
tions are integral to the operation of the democratic system of govern-
ment established by the Constitution.'66 Hence, campaign finance re-
forms must be designed to further important governmental concerns and
must be drafted as narrowly as possible to avoid infringing donors' and
candidates' first amendment freedoms of speech and association. 67 Cali-
fornia's proposed initiative contains several provisions for which consti-
tutionality is in question under existing standards. Both limiting the
amount of money a candidate can receive from aggregate contributions
and banning candidate transfers provide new, unlitigated constitutional
questions for the Court. Because the aggregate contribution limit com-
pletely bans late contributor speech and lacks a compelling justification,
the Court may strike the limit down as unconstitutional. Banning candi-
date transfers, in contrast, decreases the appearance of impropriety and
actual corruption; this provision is most likely constitutional. However,
even if these specific provisions were removed or struck down, the bal-
162. Id. at 107 n.147.
163. 487 F. Supp. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
164. Id. at 284-85.
165. Id.
166. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). See also supra note 136 and accompanying
text.
167. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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ance of the Proposed Ballot Measure would stand as good law under the
Supreme Court's analysis in Buckley. The proposed law would im-
mensely benefit political campaigning in California by increasing balance
and fairness in the campaign spending process.
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